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BOOK REVIEWS
Lobbying and the Law. By Edgar Lane. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1964. Pp. 224. $6.50.
To all but the most politically naive there should be nothing startling about the fact that the laws enacted in the legislative halls of this
country, both federal and state, are to a great extent the result of
actions of political interest groups. This is not to imply that such
a condition is an undesirable aspect of our legislative process since
it is inherent in the very nature of a democracy that the government should be an instrument to which men can come with their
needs and interests. That such interests will be conflicting and not
necessarily advantageous to all groups or to the public as a whole
does not alter the fact that the government in a free society must be
accessible and responsive to the diverse interests of its people. But
it does give rise to one of the fundamental functions and problems
of government-that of maintaining an optimum distance between
private interest and public power, and converting the interests and
needs of private individuals and groups into public policy. Lobbying and the Law, by Edgar Lane, is concerned with one aspect of this
basic problem and the part that it has played in the political structure
of our state legislatures.
The manner and methods by which individuals and groups have
sought to prompt or prevent the exercise of governmental power are
countless and range from direct person-to-person persuasion, through
appearances before legislative committees and administrative agencies, to public relations and educational programs in the broadest
sense. Indeed, such obvious acts as voting for particular candidates
or issues, writing letters to legislators or to magazines and newspapers, or contributing to political parties are very effective means
by which all citizens can directly and indirectly shape the making
of public policy. Somewhere in this wide range of activity are
those acts which are included in the concept of the term "lobbying"
-a word which is extremely difficult to define with any precision
and which gives rise to varied and conflicting connotations, but
which is generally understood to characterize those reasonably substantial and direct private efforts by men or groups of men to
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influence legislative action. While lobbying involves the exercise of
one of the most valuable rights of a free society and is recognized
as an honorable means by which men can communicate their needs
to the government, it, like any other right, has been and can be an
instrument of political abuse and corruption. Over the years the
legislatures of most of the states as well as Congress have enacted
laws for its regulation. The author of Lobbying and the Law explores in detail the origin and requirements of the state laws and
how they operate in order to determine where the regulation of
lobbying fits into the political process of the states and what it
accomplishes there.
For the most part the state laws for the regulation of lobbying
are based on the simple premise that if given access to the facts about
a situation the public and the government will take whatever action
is proper and necessary. This disclosure principle is, of course, by
no means unique, but is firmly entrenched in our democratic system
and is the underlying theory behind the federal and state laws regulating the issuance of securities, the ownership of news media, and
the reporting of campaign expenditures, as well as many other areas.
Disclosure laws as such do not prevent anyone from doing anything;
thus, most state laws, aside from the obvious prohibition of outright bribery and extortion, do not prohibit or restrict lobbying but
require persons engaging in such activities to disclose certain facts
considered to be pertinent. Typical of such disclosure laws is that
passed by the North Carolina General Assembly in 1933,1 which
defines lobbying to be the activities of
every person, corporation or association which employs any
person to act as counsel or agent to promote or oppose in any
manner the passage by the General Assembly of any legislation
affecting the pecuniary interests of any individual, association or
corporation as distinct from those of the whole people of the
State, or to act in any manner as a legislative counsel or agent
in connection with any such legislation .... 2
In essence, it requires those persons covered by the statute to report
the following information which is made available as a matter of
public record: the name and the address of the employer and agent,
the date of employment, the length of time that the employment
is to continue, the subject matter of legislation to which the em1 N.C. GEx. STAT. §§ 120-40 to -47 (1964).
2
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-40 (1964).
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ployment relates, and a detailed statement of all expenses paid or
incurred by such persons in connection with promoting or opposing
in any manner the passage by the General Assembly of any legislation. Violation of the provisions of the act constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than fifty dollars or more
than 1,000 dollars and up to two years imprisonment. A related
statute enacted in 19473 requires similar registration of persons or
organizations that are "principally engaged in the activity or business
of influencing public opinion and/or legislation in the State ....

The statute does not apply to periodicals or news media nor to
political candidates.
How do such disclosure laws work and what have they accomplished? Although the laws vary from state to state in their requirements and operation, Mr. Lane finds that for the most part they are
subject to the same basis short-comings, and he is critical of such
laws in almost every facet. Even in their origins, he contends, these
statutes were hastily enacted by "embarrassed or compromised legislatures" in response to charges and allegations that they were too
easily yielding to particular interests. Our own North Carolina
statute, he says, was enacted mainly to "quiet the insistent voice of
the Raleigh News and Observer."' Furthermore, from a textual
standpoint, the statutes lack precision, scope, and clear direction and
do not furnish any guide or standard of ethics for either the legislators or the lobbyists. Where lobbying now primarily consists of
activities of political interest groups the statutes are primarily
aimed at individual lobbyists; where lobbying is now directed toward
many levels and activities of government other than the legislature,
especially the administrative agencies, these statutes confine themselves almost solely to legislative lobbying; and where modern
lobbying techniques are mainly in the form of indirect political
persuasion the disclosure statutes reach only personal confrontation.
A lack of vigorous and positive enforcement and administration,
as well as a failure of the information derived from the disclosure
requirements to be disseminated to the public, has further caused
these laws to fall far short of their ultimate end. In short, the
author finds that the state disclosure laws as they are written, ad'N.C.
' N.C.

GEN. STAT.
GEN. STAT.

' LANE, LOBBYING

§§ 120-48 to -55 (1964).

§ 120-48 (1964).
AND THE LAW 40 (1964).
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ministered, and reacted to by the public are simply unable to cope
with the complexity of modern politics.
Any critical analysis of the states' efforts to regulate lobbying
are meaningless, however, unless it is first determined exactly what
dangers are to be eliminated and what goals are to be accomplished
by such regulation. Except for the obvious necessity of discouraging and prohibiting corruption and dishonesty, the answer to this
inquiry involves the application of fundamental political theory and
ideas; there would be many and wide differences of opinion as to
the answer. Does lobbying as such, in its modern and complex
form of group political activity, really pose any serious threat to our
democratic and representative system of government? And even
if it does, is there any realistic alternative to the disclosure principle for its control which would not in itself weaken our democratic
process? Mr. Lane, who is an Assistant Professor of Political
Science at the University of California, delves into this problem, and
although by no means will all readers of his book agree with his
conclusions, his views will be thought-provoking to those interested
in this aspect of political science.
Lobbying and the Law, in presenting a thorough and informed
appraisal of the state regulation of lobbying, is indeed a valuable
contribution to the literature about a most important facet of our
political system.
THOMAS W.

STEED, JR.

MEMBER, NORTH CAROLINA BAR
RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA

The Disinherited and the Law. By Dagobert D. Runes. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1964. Pp. 79. $3.00.
This is a bad book. If it arouses any interest at all, it will be in
those who are concerned with what a certain type of literate man-inthe-street thinks about a random sample of politico-legal issues.
Mr. Runes is agitated about a variety of topics, each of which is
treated in a highly emotional fashion. The book is filled with injunctions about what should be done concerning such diverse matters
as adultery, Communists, drug addiction, Nazis, hate peddlers (in
general), poverty, professional killers, retributive punishment, and
the seduction of old men by "eager Lolitas." Most questions are
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treated with a simplistic finality which, I expect, will be found off ensive by most readers of the Review.
On the difficult matter of the role of precedent in the law, for
example, Mr. Runes concludes, after a (one) brief paragraph:
"Law by precedent is a lingering shadow of feudalistic darkness and
medieval superstition." 1
The book consists of nineteen chapters (in seventy-five pages)
and "A Note to You !", a final series of calls to action. Each of the
chapters treats of a more or less specific topic, generally introduced
by a statement of the author's position on the question, which statement is followed by the marshalling of "evidence." Perhaps I can
best reveal the kind of book this is by examining a few of its arguments.
In a chapter called "Laws, Famous and Infamous," Mr. Runes
describes a number of cases in which, he believes, people have been
wrongly punished by the law. A woman in South Africa was jailed
because she encouraged the visit of a Negro childhood companion;
a Jew in Kiev was jailed because he sold a self-made Hebrew prayer
book; a couple in Communist China were executed because they
withheld their child from the state. Given only this much information about the cases (Mr. Runes documents nothing he says) most
readers will probably agree that these are indeed instances of injustice, that the laws which were enforced are bad laws. But in the
midst of this sample of cases appears the following:
A man in Naples, an unemployed dock worker, received a
jail sentence for stealing a side of beef from a butcher shop. It was
a week before Christmas, and he had lost his job. His meager
check from the unemployment office would not be forthcoming
for some time. He was a good man and of good faith and had a
houseful of children and an ailing wife, and he stole a side of
beef because when he looked at the beef he did not see the
watchful butcher or the hustling customers. All he saw was the
gleam of cheer in the eyes of his children and the smile of happiness on the face of his wife, if they could once again sit around
the table with a great meal before them. His failing was not that
he had disrespect for order or disregard for his Naples, but that
he had such great love for his family and a deep wish to do well
by them. It is his love that made2 him err. Is he a criminal?
There never was crime in his heart.
'RUNES, THE DISINHERITED AND THE LAW 77 (1964).
2

Id. at 12-13.
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It should be mentioned in passing that the emotionalism of the above
paragraph is characteristic of Mr. Runes's tone throughout the book.
But more important is the question of the relevance of this example
to the others. Is the point here supposed to be the same as in those
others? That would certainly be extraordinary. For those are cases
in which (it is implied) an injustice occurs because of the enforcement of a bad law. The conclusion here would then be that laws
against stealing are bad laws. Or perhaps the point is only that such
laws should not be enforced when the thief is especially destitute.
Factors of this kind, i.e., mitigating circumstances, are often taken
into account in the application of the law. But if this is the point
the example is out of place with the others. Finally, it may be that
Mr. Runes is merely arguing that good thieves, "with no crime in
their hearts," should not be punished. I suggest that there is no way
of knowing exactly what Mr. Runes intends by this illustration.
Its inclusion is a consequence of his often manifested preference
of rhetoric to reasoned argument.
In a chapter called "Judges in the Dock," Mr. Runes distinguishes from both statutory and common law, what he calls functional law. This last is the object of his attack. It has, he says,
"been forever brought into play, especially by cunning usurpers of
power . .. ."' However, it soon becomes apparent that Mr. Runes
fails to use the expression "functional law" in anything like a univocal way. Rather it comes to stand for almost any practice of which
he disapproves.
He begins by saying that functional law is an "involved system
of interpreting existing statutes."' And, an example of its employment, of which he disapproves, is revealed by the following:
[O]ur Declaration of Independence proclaimed that all men
are born free and equal. Still, some of the very men responsible
for setting down this magnificent principle, upon returning to
their home states in the South, promptly developed the functional
law of explanation that freedom and equality did not apply to
black people living as slaves, because slaves were not really
",men." 5
Of this passage it must be said that "functional law" is used in a
way we would expect, given Mr. Runes's definition. That is, what
8

id. at 6.

' Ibid.
aIbid.
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is involved in the case he describes is the interpretationof a word,
i.e., "men." Of course, even here all is not well. For Mr. Runes said
that functional law is a system of interpreting existing statutes-and
the principle enunciated in the Declaration of Independence is manifestly not a statute. But notice the second example:
As long ago as 1870 the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution stated: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
Still, the functional law of interpretation can eliminate the black
citizen by merely adding a few detailed requirements for voting,
such as payment of an unobtainable poll tax or a circuitous literacy
test which only persons of the examiner's choice can pass.,
This is certainly not a case of functional law, as Mr. Runes has defined that expression. For the prevention of Negroes from voting
is, on Mr. Runes's account, not accomplished by interpreting the existing law. It is accomplished by adding new provisions to that law.
A legal theorist who fails to distinguish such radically different
phenomena cannot be expected to say much of interest on the genuinely subtle problems of legal philosophy. And indeed, on the exceedingly difficult issues generally discussed under the heading of
"Civil Rights," Mr. Runes, instead of ratiocination, offers us only a
barrage of emotion:
Every thinking person is aware that the legalistic functionalism practiced in the South is in open contradiction to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. But so great is the veneration for
any legal proposition that even the obnoxious perversion of
scheming functioneers is met with respect rather than disdain.
Instead of cutting through the pretentious functional verbosity of
those pseudo-pundits, the duly invested federal officers forever
grope for other judicial tricks to outflank the obvious judicial
connivers. Why do those who have the power and duty to enforce
a good law attempt to sneak its majesty through some dark loophole, instead of marching it proudly through the wide-open gate
of public enforcement ?'
That men of good will may disagree on this question appears not
to have occurred to Mr. Runes. I imagine that those (whatever
their stand) who have thought seriously about the issue will look
with disdain on Mr. Runes's embarrassing display.
8 Id.
7 Id.

at 6-7.
at 7.
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To all this Mr. Runes adds a disturbing contempt for facts. In
a chapter called "Fearful Justice" he says that
There is no doubt that those in the past and in the present who
have proposed the most severe punishment in retaliation for
offenses are in the right.
Fear of harsh or cruel consequences will deter many from
overstepping regulations.8
Mr. Runes goes on to oppose harsh punishment. With that argument
I shall not be concerned. My point is that in this chapter he says,
or at least implies, that harsh punishment is in fact a deterrent. But
thirty-three pages later, Mr. Runes informs us that "punishment may
deter animals, not people .

. . ."I

Of course, in neither case is any

evidence brought to bear on the question of the deterrent effect of
punishment. Mr. Runes contents himself with asserting what he
believes to be suitable for the argument at hand. More annoying,
though, is that his assertions are not even consistent with each other.
The rest of the book contains more of the same. Mr. Runes
goes on and on unburdening himself in the inconsistent, rambling
fashion I have described. The Disinheritedand the Law contributes
nothing to the understanding of the problems with which it deals.
It is, in fact, little more than an exercise in tabloid writing, and
students of the law will lose nothing by ignoring it.
BRUCE GOLDBERG

INSTRUCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Wills and Administration of Estates in North Carolina. By Norman
Adrian Wiggins. Atlanta: The Harrison Company, 1964. Pp.
1493. $45.00.
Books, I believe, can be properly classified in two main categories, namely, "read-through" books and "read-from" books.
Novels, short stories and such would fall in the first category; and
encyclopedias, texts and the like in the latter category. If you open
a "read-from" book at random and partake of the printed matter
thereon, likely as not you have received a complete and accurate
r~sum6 of a given topic. Cheers for the "read-froms" for they keep
most of the professions and many businesses up to date and well
informed.
8 Id.
at 24.
0Id.
at 57.
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Wills and Administration of Estates in North Carolinais, without question or doubt, an exceptionally fine "read-from" book. Designed by gentle hands and nimble wit, it will enrich its reader.
The reader is rewarded with clip and accurate statements of the law
and its application to probate and fiduciary problems. Professor
Wiggins, with deft insight into practical application of fiduciary
law, gives the law as it now is, how it has been, and on occasion,
being the scholar, how it perhaps should be.
The most encouraging feature of this text is the fact that the
North Carolina law has been clearly set forth. Without falling
victim of voluminous copy, Professor Wiggins has made an all out
effort to touch on as many as possible of the practical problems and
questions that confront the North Carolina Executor or Administrator. This volume is a must for the lawyer. It will also serve
well the trust men of our state.
Professor Wiggins's treatment of the King's English is both
deft and candid, which makes for easy and understandable reading.
Detailed footnotes lead the reader to his case, treatise, or statutory
reference, and enable the stouthearted to pursue his point into the
legal archives with the sure knowledge that Professor Wiggins has
been there before him.
The purpose of this book is to set down in one place a complete
and annotated treatment of probate and fiduciary law as it applies
in North Carolina. I read the entire book with the avowed purpose of
defending the world against this intruder, only to find myself captivated, immersed and thoroughly converted, indeed a propounder.
The professor has made good his intentions.
One final observation seems in order. Professor Wiggins, by
this work, has demonstrated and does exhibit his ability as a scholar
and student of the law. But, perhaps more important, his writing
is keyed to the practical application of probate and fiduciary law.
The reader will find himself enriched by the author's own practical
and clinical experience as a lawyer, student, trust man, and teacher.
Wills and Administration of Estates in North Carolina is indeed
a fine text which will make a valuable and working edition to your
R. F. CLODFELTER
law library.
VICE-PRESIDENT, TRUST DEPARTMENT
WACHOVIA BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
WINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA

